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houses, have luxuriantly spread and have finally to the careless eye obscured the features of the original event. Thus we may once for all dismiss as legendary the witchery of the *dogaressa* in whose beautiful face, as if it were the face of another Helen, romancing chroniclers were disposed to discover the prime source of the subsequent disasters. Likewise we may much reduce the traditional proportions of the insult offered to the doge by riotous members of the nobility. Lazzarini has clearly shown: (1) that an insult put upon a doge was nothing unique in Venetian annals; and (2) that the punishment which was meted out to the culprits and which is usually represented as ridiculously light, was fully as severe as the practice of the century prescribed.

Having cut away, one after another, the mythical incidents of the conspiracy, Lazzarini puts before us finally a small but compact kernel of facts. These facts soberly considered suffice to transfer the history of Marino Faliero from the nebular realm of Byronism, to which it has been so long confined, to this our earth, and set it upon a solid and reasonable foundation of human motive and contemporary circumstance. Lazzarini's demonstration will leave little doubt in any mind that if Marino Faliero did not, like a mere vain, bungling fool, undertake to overthrow the mighty oligarchy of Venice because he had been lampooned by some swaggering dandies, neither did he, moved by vague premonitions of an era of *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, attempt to supplant the nefarious regimen of the aristocracy by a popular government. It seems quite plain from Lazzarini that the dominating idea of the conspiring doge was personal and political. He simply wished to free himself from the restrictions with which in the course of time the Venetian executive had been shackled and to acquire, after the fashion of the contemporary despots of Padua, Milan, Verona, and all northern Italy, the *dominium* or absolute power over the Venetian realm. It is only too probable that in this desire he was confirmed by personal animosities, but motives of this nature we cannot help assigning in the case of so experienced and politic a gentleman as Faliero to a secondary rank.

These results, here briefly outlined, can hardly be called new. They are embodied in the reputable histories of Venice from Leo down to Battistella. Lazzarini's merit, therefore, does not consist in the novelty of his presentation; it consists rather in having buttressed the old surmises and deductions with such masses of interesting and assured facts that the ancient hypotheses transform themselves under our eyes to indubitable statements.

FERDINAND SCHWILL.

The Diplomatic History of America. Its First Chapter. 1452-1493-1494. BY HENRY HARRISSE. (London: B. F. Stevens. 1897. Pp. viii, 230.)

MR. HENRY HARRISSE, after having done more than any man in his generation to reveal all that can be known of the process of the discovery

of the new world, has now turned his attention to the relations between the European powers that grew out of the discoveries. The "first chapter" of this diplomatic history is an examination of the papal concessions to Portugal in 1452 and later, of the Bulls of Alexander VI., 1493, and of the treaty of Tordesillas, 1494. There is also a brief account of the Badajos Junta, 1523-24, the detailed history of whose proceedings will constitute "chapter second" of his large design. The completeness, critical thoroughness, and sobriety of judgment with which Mr. HARRISSE has treated these topics deserve the highest praise.

His narrative begins with the first Bull of Nicholas V., 1452, thus dismissing in silence the frequently mentioned Bull of Martin V., which the generally careful Muñoz apparently deduced from a passage in Barros, but of which no documentary trace has come down to us. The only Bull of Martin V. that has to do with the Portuguese conquests and that has come down to us is that of March 5, 1421, which provides for the organization of the new bishopric of Ceuta. Of the Bulls confirming that of Nicholas, issued in 1454, Mr. HARRISSE remarks (p. 158) that he has not been able to find that of Calixtus III., which was mentioned by Juan and Ulloa. It is to be found in the collection, *Alguns Documentos do Archivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo acerca das Navegações e Conquistas Portuguezas*, Lisbon, 1892, pp. 20-22. For the treaty of 1479 between Spain and Portugal, in regard to their maritime possessions, he quotes a Portuguese manuscript copy in the Paris National Library. It may be of service to add that the Spanish text which was signed at Toledo, March 6, 1480, has been preserved in the Portuguese archives and is printed in the collection just mentioned, p. 42.

Mr. HARRISSE can find no evidence that the placing of the demarcation line at a distance of one hundred leagues from the Azores and Cape Verde Islands was suggested by any outside influence, and is satisfied that the proposition came from the Pope's own advisers, who thought it best to leave the Portuguese a convenient and suitable margin of space in the ocean to the west of their possessions. In his translation of the passage in the Bull making this provision: "Quae linea distet a qualibet insularum, quae vulgariter nuncupantur de los Azores y Cabo Verde," Mr. HARRISSE is certainly in error. He renders the last words "the Azores and Cape Verde," and remarks upon the difference in latitude and longitude between that cape and the Azores Islands. The correct translation is "the islands called in the vernacular the Azores and Cape Verde [Islands]." The use of the Spanish connective "y" shows that to justify Mr. HARRISSE's rendering the text would have to read "de los Azores et a Cabo Verde." I am unable also to assent to the proposition that Alexander's Bull of Extension, September 25, 1493, superseded the Demarcation Bull. It did so only on the supposition that the Demarcation Bull was originally intended by the Pope to be extended round the globe. Of this there is no indication. The existence of the Antipodes is ignored in the Bull of May 4. What the Bull of September 25 did was to substitute for a possible extension of the line to the Antipodes the

principle of the priority of discovery. Of course this might, in effect, have deprived the Portuguese of any advantages from the Demarcation Bull if a Spanish explorer could have done immediately what was accomplished by Magellan's expedition. But that possibility was hardly contemplated. The Bull of September 25 reads as if it were intended merely to supplement that of May 4, not to abrogate it. Mr. Harrisse feels that there is some ground for suspecting the authenticity of this Bull of Extension, but, on the whole, he is inclined to accept it as genuine. That it was not invoked to defend the Spanish claims to the Moluccas is, perhaps, slightly unfavorable to its authenticity, but when that question arose everybody seemed to take for granted the extension of the Torde-sillas line to the other side of the world.

Those who are interested in the theoretical question as to where the Demarcation Line should have been drawn,—a problem quite beyond sixteenth-century science,—will find in the notes very careful calculations of the various questions according to methods devised by the author's friend, M. Bauvieux. Besides these mathematical discussions, the notes contain that wealth of bibliographical references which makes every student of Mr. Harrisse's books his grateful debtor. Many readers will be glad too for the apparently complete list of Mr. Harrisse's writings on the period of the discoveries.

EDWARD G. BOURNE.

L'Économie Sociale de la France sous Henri IV., 1589-1610. By GUSTAVE FAGNIEZ. (Paris : Hachette et Cie. 1897. Pp. 428.)

THIS is a history "with a purpose." The professed object of the writer is to show "in what manner a people is able to lift itself up from decadence, in what measure its own forces are sufficient for that purpose, and how far it has need for those of its government." Such an ulterior purpose might seem to leave but little room to expect a work of true historical investigation. Yet Mr. Fagniez has written a book which is scholarly, learned and unprejudiced to an unusual degree. The resolution of the paradox is to be found in the fact that he has chosen for his study a period in which the restoration of order after anarchy and the intelligent efforts of an active and benevolent king combined to bring a country from a condition of almost complete despair to a comparatively high state of prosperity. In writing of the economic history of the period of Henry IV. of France, the historian may very well give a plain and moderate account of the efforts made for settlement and improvement, and at the same time be preaching a vigorous sermon on the advantages of a benevolent despotism.

The book consists of four chapters, on rural economy, manufactures, and external and internal commerce, respectively. The starting-point in each of these fields is the same, the chaos resulting from the civil wars. If it is in the rural districts it is the persistent brigandage of the nobles, but half converted from their accustomed guerrilla warfare. and of bands of